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I.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions

A. Issue1
This memorandum addresses whether, in the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (“ICTR”), a mens rea of recklessness or gross negligence can lead to a
conviction of a crime against humanity assuming the accused has knowledge of the
widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population on discriminatory grounds.
The first part of this memorandum demonstrates the context in which the issue arises in
the international criminal tribunals. This part defines mens rea, discusses the role mens
rea plays within the elements of a crime against humanity and provides a hypothetical
scenario to help illustrate the context of the issue. The second part of this memorandum
analyses how recklessness and gross negligence in the underlying crime may be used to
obtain convictions for crimes against humanity in the ICTR.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1.

The Lack of Specificity in the Statutes of the International Criminal
Tribunals Allows for Broad Interpretation of the Mens Rea Requirement for
the Underlying Crimes of a Crime Against Humanity
The fact that the statutes of the international criminal tribunals are (for the most

part) silent on the mens rea requirement for the underlying crimes of a crime against
humanity, has given the Chambers freedom to include recklessness and gross negligence
as appropriate mens rea. Even though the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (“ICC Statute”) has been said to provide for a narrow mens rea standard, the ICC
Statute should not be interpreted to limit mens rea to only the most culpable mental states
(intent and/or knowledge).
1

Issue: Is recklessness or gross negligence sufficient mens rea for conviction of a Crime Against Humanity
if one has knowledge of the widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population on
discriminatory grounds? For definition of mens rea, see infra pp. 5-7.

1

First, the ICC Statute allows reliance on sources of law which accept mens rea
with lesser culpability (recklessness, gross negligence and simple negligence) in criminal
convictions. Second, the ICC is yet to try a case, and therefore, the ICC Statute has not
been interpreted or applied by the court which it governs.

Until the ICC begins

developing case law, the ICC Statute remains open to interpretation. Third, the ICC
Statute can be read to include even the least culpable mens rea to be sufficient to convict
for crimes against humanity. Essentially, the lack of guidance from the Statutes of the
international criminal tribunals should be interpreted as an opportunity to broaden the
scope of appropriate mens rea for crimes against humanity.
2.

The International Criminal Tribunals and General Principles of Law
Support Convictions of Crimes Against Humanity by Means of a Mens Rea
of Recklessness, Gross Negligence and Simple Negligence for the Underlying
Crimes
The case law of the international criminal tribunals and general principles of law

provide the ICTR with an abundance of precedent favoring the use of recklessness, gross
negligence and simple negligence to obtain convictions for crimes against humanity.
Nonetheless, policy concerns and conflicts of opinion between the Chambers of the ICTR
have proven to be a barrier to a broadened frame of reference for mens rea.
Despite these roadblocks, recklessness, gross negligence and simple negligence
have emerged as established forms of criminal culpability in the ICTR and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”). Admittedly, the
emergence of lesser culpable mental states in the tribunals has been inconsistent and
ambiguous. However, this memo will argue that murder, extermination, rape and “other
inhumane acts” are underlying crimes of a crime against humanity with clear ICTR/ICTY
precedent to support a conviction of a crime against humanity using the mens rea of

2

lesser culpability. Also, gross negligence and even negligence will be shown to be
sufficient mens rea to convict an individual with command responsibility or who is
involved in a joint criminal enterprise. The case law of the ICTR and ICTY and general
principles of law are powerful weapons of the prosecutors to obtain convictions for
crimes against humanity.
II.

Factual Background

A.

Mens rea: An Unsettled Issue in International Criminal Law
Those accused of crimes against humanity in the international criminal tribunals

face ambiguous and unsettled notions of the fundamentals of international criminal law in
the Chambers of the ICTR and ICTY. Ambiguity surrounding the concepts of criminal
culpability is no exception.

While domestic courts offer a wealth of time-tested

precedent on the standards of criminal liability for specific crimes, it is difficult to
identify the different forms of criminal culpability in international criminal law.2 There is
a general deficiency of substantive rules, customary international law, and jurisprudence
defining the variations and degrees of culpability for the perpetration of crimes against
humanity.3 Domestic law provides often detailed assessments of the elements of crimes
which are common to international criminal tribunals, such as murder, rape and
imprisonment.

However, a person accused of a crime against humanity in an

international criminal tribunal is subject to different elements of the prima facie and
harsher punishment than in the case of national crimes developed in the centuries of
existing domestic law. Additionally, crimes against humanity include other individual
2

ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 159 (Oxford University Press 2003). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]
3

Id. at 159, 160.

3

crimes which have not been extensively developed in the world’s legal systems nor under
customary international law, including: persecution, deportation, enslavement, and “other
inhumane acts.” Since mens rea and criminal culpability are so closely related,4 and the
law of crimes against humanity is not always clear, the international criminal tribunals
have not unanimously defined the mens rea required for the underlying crimes.
However, over the course of time the tribunals have and will continue to work towards
establishing solid notions of mens rea. This memorandum will discuss the current state
of acceptance of recklessness and gross negligence as requisite mens rea in the
international criminal tribunals.
B.

Hypothetical: The Reckless Priest
The following hypothetical fact-pattern is to illustrate some of the issues in

determining appropriate mens rea for the underlying crime in a crime against humanity.
At the end of this memo, this hypothetical is discussed to help develop final thoughts:
The hypothetical country of Utopia is ravaged by civil war. The civil war has
been fought between the current Utopian government and the Rebel Group. Utopia is
also populated by many separate tribal groups of the same ethnicity, who, until recently,
were neutral bystanders to the civil war. The devastated political, economic and human
rights conditions in Utopia have caused many of the tribal groups to fight amongst
themselves and take sides in the civil war.
A Catholic priest has been providing shelter at a mission for 1,000 refugees of a
certain tribal group in southern Utopia. The priest has been offered food rations from a
tribal group from western Utopia which has generally had friendly ties with the refugees

4

Infra p. 6.

4

at his mission. However, the priest is aware that the tribal group providing the food
rations has allied with the Utopian government. The southern Utopian tribal group taking
refuge at the mission has traditionally opposed the Utopian government.
The priest has heard credible rumors that the Utopian government recently
supplied poisoned food rations to different tribal groups in southern Utopia who are also
in opposition of the Utopian government. Aware of this risk, and against his best
judgment the priest accepts the food rations and provides them to the refugees.
Unfortunately, the food rations were poisoned and all 1,000 refugees die.
The priest is later indicted for the crime against humanity of extermination by the
International Criminal Tribunal for Utopia (“ICTU”). If the ICTU accepts recklessness
or gross negligence as the requisite mens rea for the crime against humanity of
extermination then the priest conceivably faces conviction and life imprisonment and the
terrible public stigma of committing a most heinous crime. However, if the mens rea
requirement is limited to knowledge and intent, then the priest is not criminally liable and
would be acquitted of the charges.
III.

Legal Discussion

A.

Defining Mens Rea
In criminal courts, the necessity that an accused have a certain actus reus

(physical act, or omission) and mens rea (mental state) is “’universal and persistent in
mature systems of law.’”5 Literally, mens rea is a mental state said to mean “guilty

5

The Prosecutor v. Mucic, et al. (the Celebici case), IT-96-21, Judgment of 16 November 1998, para 424.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]

5

mind.”6 The use of mens rea in determining criminal liability has its root in belief that
punishment should depend upon moral guilt and evil-doing.7 Although, the concept of
mens rea has changed over time with the movements and objectives of criminal justice.8
Modern ideas of mens rea have moved in the direction of meaning an intention which
unduly endangers social or public interests.9
The mens rea requirement is not without exception. In the case of strict, or
absolute liability criminal conduct alone leads to a conviction. However, thus far, the
ICTR and the other international criminal tribunals have rejected absolute liability even
in the cases where the least culpable mens rea can lead to a conviction.10 As international
humanitarian law now stands, mens rea is a mandatory element of all criminal
prosecutions.11

6

William A. Schabas, Mens Rea and the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 1015 (2003). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 38.]
7

Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 988 (1932). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 39.]
8

Id. at 1016.

9

Id. at 1017-1019 (“It is clear that mens rea means something quite distinct from mere immorality of
motive. An act performed for a laudable or even religious motive may constitute a crime, just as an act
performed for a depraved or immoral purpose may not constitute a crime. [W]hatever the early conception
of mens rea may have been, as the law grew the requisite mental elements of the various felonies developed
along different lines to meet exigencies and social needs which varied with each felony.”), see also CHERIF
M.BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 170 (Charles C. Thomas 1978) (“Thus the determination of
intent, its existence, and extent is a matter of social policy which reflects social values and may to that
extent contain an element of moral blameworthiness. As an element of determined by social policy, intent
is viewed as directly linked to the purposes of punishment and is usually framed only to the extent that, if
found to exist in a crime, the punishment which ensues will be in keeping with the policies of the criminal
sanction.”). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 37.]
10

The Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, ICTR-95-1, Judgement of 7 June 2001, para. 44, [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 9]; contra SCHABAS, supra note 4 at 1016 (“Recently, the United
Nations agreed to include such an “absolute liability” offence within the subject matter jurisdiction of its
third ad hoc tribunal, the Special Court of Sierra Leone, which is supposedly designed to prosecute only
“those who bear the greatest responsibility” for the atrocities committed during that country’s civil war.”).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 38.]

11

Id.

6

The major legal systems of the world agree that there are different degrees of
mens rea.12 In other words, the level of the perpetrator’s (or participant’s) culpability
depends on his/her frame of mind. There are four main categories of mental states that
justify punishable criminal conduct: intent, recklessness, culpable or gross negligence,
and inadvertent or simple negligence.13

The civil law systems usually combine

knowledge and intent into one mental state, intent.14 Common law systems tend to
separate intent and knowledge and place a lesser culpability on a mens rea of knowledge
than for intent.15 The following are generally accepted definitions of the culpable mental
states:
1.

Intent
Antonio Cassese defines intent and provides an example: “the will to bring about

a certain result: I use a gun to shoot at a person because I want to kill him. This class of
mens rea is normally called intent.”16 However, the word “intent” is ambiguous because
it has other meanings.17 Black’s Law Dictionary defines intent as “the state of mind

12

CHERIF M. BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 300 (Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1992); CASSESE, supra note 1 at 161. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 32.]

13

Id.

14

Id. at 164.

15

Id.

16

Id. at 161.

17

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 813 (7th ed. 1999); citing, JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE, 383-84
(Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed. 1947) (“The phrase ‘with intent to,’ or it equivalents, may mean any
one of at least four different things: -- (1) That the intent referred to must be the sole or exclusive intent; (2)
that it is sufficient it is one of several concurrent intents; (3) that it must be the chief or dominant intent,
and others being subordinate or incidental; (4) that it must be a determining intent, that is to say, an intent
in the absence of which the act would not have been done, the remaining purposes being insufficient
motives by themselves. It is a question of construction which of those meanings is the true one in the
particular case.”). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 33.]

7

accompanying an act, esp. a forbidden act.”18

This definition represents a general,

culpable mental state similar to the broad definition of mens rea. Black’s Law Dictionary
uses the term “specific intent” to refer to the category of intent expressed in Mr.
Cassese’s definition above.

Specific intent is “the intent to accomplish the precise

criminal act that one is later charged with.”19 The Model Penal Code (“MPC”) opts for
the term “purpose” instead of specific intent, or Mr. Cassese’s “intent,” possibly to avoid
problems of interpretation.

The MPC definition of “purpose” is when it is a person’s

conscious object to engage in conduct and/or to cause a certain result.20
2.

Knowledge
Again, the mens rea of knowledge is most familiar to common law systems. The

MPC of the United States defines “knowledge” as a person’s awareness of that person’s
conduct or of certain circumstances, and awareness that a certain result is practically
certain to be caused by the conduct and/or circumstances.21 Example: a terrorist plants a
car bomb on the vehicle used by a targeted government official. The terrorist is aware
that in addition to the targeted government official, several other, non-targeted
individuals will be inside the vehicle at the explosion of the car bomb. The terrorist does
not intend to kill other individuals but knows that it is practically certain that they will die

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

ALI MODEL PENAL CODE, §2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 1.]
21

Id. (“A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offence when: (i) if the element
involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that
nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware
that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.”).

8

in the blast. The terrorist’s mens rea as to the death of the other, non-targeted individuals
is knowledge.
3.

Recklessness22
The New York Penal Law defines recklessness as: “a person acts recklessly with

respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when
she is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial unjustifiable risk that such a
result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and
degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.”23
4.

Gross Negligence
Antonio Cassese defines and discusses gross negligence as follows: gross

negligence is “failure to pay sufficient attention to or to comply with certain generally
accepted standards of conduct thereby causing harm to another person when the actor
believes that the harmful consequences of his action will not come about, thanks to the
measures he has taken or is about to take (for instance…one of two persons playing with
a loaded gun points it at the other and pulls the trigger believing that it will not fire
because neither bullet is in the opposite barrel; however, the gun is a revolver, it does
fire, killing the other person).”

22

The term dolus eventualis is interchangeable with recklessness. See CASSESE, supra note 2 at 176.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]
23

New York Penal Law § 15.05.3, available at http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/web/nycriminallaw.htm;
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2.] see also supra note 20 (“A person acts recklessly
with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances
known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding
person would observe in the actor’s situation.”). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]

9

The MPC definition is essentially the same:24 “A person acts negligently with
respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, considering the
nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s
situation.”25
5.

Simple Negligence
Although simple negligence is generally not a criminally culpable mens rea,

under narrow circumstances, the international criminal tribunals have found negligence to
justify conviction of a crime against humanity. A negligent person is someone who does
not act as a “reasonable person” and fails to realize what is natural and foreseeable.26
Note that when a court applies an objective test to determine an accused’s mental state,
the mens rea requirement is considered to be reduced to negligence.27
B.

The Recognition of Lesser Culpable Mental States in the Criminal Courts of
Pre and Post-World War II

24

The MPC definition of negligence is criminal negligence, or gross negligence. Id.

25

Id.

26

SCHABAS, supra note 6 at 1033. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 38.]

27

WAYNE R. LAFAVE, AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 328 (West Publishing Co.
1986) (“While negligence thus requires that the defendant’s conduct create an unreasonable risk of harm to
others, he is nonetheless negligent though he is unaware of the fact that his conduct creates any such risk.
All that negligence requires is that he ought to have been aware of it (i.e., that a reasonable man would have
been aware of it). Thus negligence is framed in terms of an objective (sometimes called “external”)
standard, rather than in terms of a subjective standard.”). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 34.]

10

At the inception of adjudication of crimes against humanity, in pre and postWorld War II German and British cases, lesser forms of culpable mens rea appear as
legitimate grounds for convictions.

These cases supply background and a point of

reference for the modern day international criminal tribunals with regard to the subject
matter of this memorandum.
In 1946, the Offenburg Tribunal (Landgericht) found an accused guilty of the
crime against humanity of persecution based upon a mens rea of recklessness.28 This
case, K. and M., dealt with a German soldier, Konninger, at home on leave who spoke
against the German leadership while having drinks at a dinner party with friends and
acquaintances.29 One of the acquaintances reported Konninger’s behavior to German
authorities and Konninger was subsequently found guilty of defeatism and sentenced to
death. K., the acquaintance who reported Konninger, was later indicted and found guilty
despite the fact that K. did not intend for Konninger to be executed. The Offenburg
Tribunal found: “It is entirely credible that the accused K. did not intend all that.
However, he was to expect that this would be the result of his talk at the restaurant. He
must foresee this result. He tacitly approved it. There was therefore recklessness on his
part.”30

28

Other cases brought before two post-World War II courts similarly found reckless to be sufficient to
convict for crimes against humanity: the Tribunal of Walshut (W., judgment of 16 February 1949, at 147),
the German Supreme Court in the British Occupied Zone (K., judgment of 27 July 1948) (“According to
the court the accused ‘was aware that the denunciation could have entailed the most grave consequences for
M. [the victim], was the accused knew of the criminal and arbitrary manner in which the Gestapo abused its
power at the time.”); L. and others, judgment of 14 December 1948 (“’it was inconceivable’ that they, who
were old officials of the Nazi party, ‘did not at least think it possible and consider that in the case at issue,
through their participation, persons were being assaulted by a system of violence and injustice; more is not
required for the mental element.”). CASSESSE, supra note 2, at 170, 171. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]
29

Id. at 169.

30

Id. at 170.

11

Also, in 1921, the Leipzig Supreme Court in the case of Stenger and Crusius
convicted an accused of ordering the execution of wounded Frenchmen, based upon a
negligently misinterpreted verbal order from his superior. The court found that “in view
of the accused’s background and personality, he should have anticipated the illegal
outcome which is easily demonstrated even if his mental and emotional states at the time
were to be fully taken into consideration.”31 The accused, Crusius, was convicted for
causing death with a mens rea of culpable negligence and was sentenced to two years’
imprisonment. Another case, from the British Court of Appeal in the British Zone of
Control in Germany, convicted a group of German police officers and doctors for crimes
against humanity. The police officers induced individuals of gypsy blood to sign consent
to sterilization through threats, and the doctors performed the sterilizations. One of the
physicians, Günther, was convicted for having a mens rea of gross negligence for not
inquiring as to whether the gypsies were being sterilized on account of their race.32
Clearly, the application of recklessness and gross negligence has its roots in cases
which form part of the legacy of modern international courts.

These early cases

demonstrate that lesser culpable mental states have been recognized in the history of
international criminal jurisprudence.
C.

Sources of Mens Rea in a Crime Against Humanity
To begin an analysis of mens rea for crimes against humanity in modern courts, it

is important to first describe the sources of the mental elements that compose a crime
against humanity. There are three sources of mens rea in a crime against humanity; (1)

31

Id. at 174.

32

Id.

12

the chapeau elements; (2) the underlying crime33; and (3) individual criminal
responsibility.
1.

The Chapeau Elements
The chapeau elements bring a crime enumerated in Article 3 of The Statute of the

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR Statute”) to the level of a crime
against humanity.

In other words, when an underlying crime, such as murder, is

committed within the context of the chapeau elements, the severity of the crime then
raises to a degree of atrocity considered to be a crime against humanity. The ICTR
Statute defines the chapeau elements in Article 3:

“The International Tribunal for

Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.”34
Generally, the mens rea requirement for the chapeau elements has been found to
be knowledge.35 Given that the issue analyzed in this memo assumes the requisite

33

The Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, IT-95-14/2, Judgment of 26 February 2001, para. 211.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]

34

The chapeau elements of a crime against humanity in the ICTR Statute are distinct from the chapeau
elements of a crime against humanity in the statutes of other international criminal tribunals in that the
ICTR Statute includes elements on discriminatory grounds.

The chapeau elements of Article 2 of the Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone are: “The Special
Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed the following crimes as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population.” STATUTE OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR
SIERRA LEONE, available at http://www.sc-sl.org. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
The chapeau elements of Article 5 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia:
“The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes
when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any
civilian population” STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL OF YUGOSLAVIA, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4.]
35

JOHN R. W. D. JONES, THE PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA 111, (Transnational Publishers 2000) (“Thus if the perpetrator has knowledge,
either actual or constructive, that these acts were occurring on a widespread or systematic basis and does
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knowledge of the chapeau elements, the scope of this memo will not touch on whether
recklessness or gross negligence is sufficient mens rea for the chapeau elements.
2.

The Underlying Crime in a Crime Against Humanity
An underlying crime is one of the enumerated crimes spelled out in Article 3 of

the ICTR Statute and similarly expressed in the statutes of the other international criminal
tribunals.36 As enumerated in the ICTR Statute, the underlying crimes are: murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on
political, racial and religious grounds, and other inhumane acts.37 Generally, the statutes
of the international criminal tribunals, including the ICTR Statute, provide little insight

not commit his act for purely personal motives completely unrelated to the attack on the civilian
population, that is sufficient to hold him liable for crimes against humanity. Therefore, the perpetrator
must know that there is an attack on the civilian population, know that his act fits in with the attack and the
act must not be taken for purely personal reasons unrelated to the armed conflict.”). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 36.]
36

The underlying elements of the crimes against humanity in the ICTY Statute are: murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecution and other inhumane treatment.
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL OF YUGOSLAVIA, ARTICLE 2, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4.]
The underlying elements of the crimes against humanity in the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
are: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence; persecution on political, racial, ethnic
or religious grounds; and other inhumane treatment. STATUTE OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE,
ARTICLE 2, available at http://www.sc-sl.org. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
The underlying elements of the crimes against humanity in the ICC Statute are: murder; extermination;
enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of
physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; torture; rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity; persecution discriminatory grounds; enforced disappearance of persons; the crime of
apartheid; and other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious
injury to body or to mental or physical health. ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
ARTICLE 7, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 5.]
37

STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, ARTICLE 3, available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
6.]
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into the mens rea requirement needed for the underlying crime to convict an accused for
a crime against humanity.38
3.

Individual Criminal Responsibility
The third and final source of mens rea in a crime against humanity is individual

criminal responsibility. Article 6 of the ICTR Statute enumerates the basis of individual
criminal responsibility:
1.
A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime
referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute, shall be individually
responsible for the crime.
2.
The official position of any accused person, whether head of state
of government or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve
such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
3.
The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the
present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her
superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know
that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measure to prevent
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
4.
The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a
government or of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal
responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the
International Tribunal of Rwanda determines that justice so requires.
Individual criminal responsibility is based on the concept of personal culpability,
or nulla poena sine culpa. “The basic assumption must be that in international law as
much as in national systems, the foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of
personal culpability: nobody may be held criminally responsible for acts or transactions
in which he has not personally engaged or in some other way participated (nulla poena

38

CASSESE, supra note 2, at 159. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]
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sine culpa).”39 Article 6 of the ICTR Statute, and similar articles in the statutes of the
other international criminal tribunals, define the circumstances in which an accused is
criminally responsible for his/her actions in the execution of a crime against humanity.40
Article 6 provides general guidelines but does not identify the scope of the situations in
which a person becomes criminally responsible for his/her acts or omissions.41
Fortunately, the international criminal tribunals have interpreted the individual criminal
responsibility statutes and have formulated specific circumstances in which an accused
incurs individual criminal responsibility.

In his book, International Criminal Law,

Antonio Cassese describes nine categories of individual criminal responsibility for
conduct and omission as developed in the international criminal tribunals. Eight of these
categories deal with conduct: perpetration, co-perpetration, participation in a common
purpose or design, aiding and abetting, incitement or instigation, inchoate crimes,
planning, ordering, and attempt.42 Criminal responsibility for omissions occurs in the
case of superior responsibility.43
As discussed below, individual criminal responsibility provides a practical
method of utilizing a mens rea of recklessness or gross negligence as a vehicle to a
conviction of a crime against humanity.
39

The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1, Judgment of 15 July 1999, para. 186. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]

40

VIRGINA MORRIS AND MICHAEL SCHARF, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 198
(Transnational Publishers 1998 ). (“In order to be criminally responsible for a crime against humanity, the
underlying crime must actually be committed. This differs from the crime of genocide where the crime
does not need to be executed to derive criminal responsibility.”). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 35.]
41

Criminal responsibility creates accountability for both action and inaction; the conduct and omissions of
an accused.
42

CASSESE, supra note 2 at 181-196. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]

43

Id. at 203.
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D.

Mens Rea And The Underlying Crimes
Generally, there is no argument that intent and knowledge are sufficient mens rea

to convict an accused of an underlying crime of a crime against humanity.44 However,
the international tribunals have established that other mental states satisfy the mens rea
standard for the underlying crime, but have not been consistent in determining exactly
which categories of mens rea apply. There are various sources of law that the tribunals
may rely upon. Some of these sources of law offer clear rules on the application of mens
rea, while other sources provide ambiguous guidance. So, two questions arise; what do
the sources of law say about mens rea and the underlying crime; and which law ought to
be applied in an international criminal tribunal, especially when one or more of the
sources of law may be ambiguous or inconsistent? As a preliminary matter, Article 21 of
the ICC Statute instructs to rely on the following sources of law (in order of priority):
first, the statutory provisions; second, customary international law; and third, general
principles of law from the legal systems of the world, including the law of the “States that
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime.”45
44

SCHABAS, supra note 6 at 1024. (“[T]here has never been any doubt that intent or knowledge be a
requirement for proof that an individual has committed crimes against humanity.”). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 38.]

45

THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ARTICLE 21, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
(The Court shall apply:
(a)
In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rule of Procedure and
Evidence;
(b)
In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of
international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed
conflict;
(c)
Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal
systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would
normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not
inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized
norms and standards.). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5.];
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1.

Mens Rea and the Underlying Crimes in the Statutes of the International
Criminal Tribunals
While the statutes of the ICTR, ICTY and the Special Court for Sierra Leone

provide no guidance in determining the minimum mens rea of the underlying crime,46 the
ICC Statute treats mens rea directly. It may be said that Article 30 of the ICC Statute of
the International Criminal Court favors knowledge or intent as sufficient mens rea for a
conviction of an underlying crime: “Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.” However,
there are compelling arguments to expand the range of acceptable mental states.
The Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court (“PCNICC”)47
found that where no specific reference to mens rea of an underlying crime is written in
the language of the ICC Statute, the requisite mens rea for a conviction is “intent,
knowledge or both.”48 Antonio Cassese agrees that, although the Article 30 requires

see also, Tadic, supra note 39 para. 287 (“The same conclusion is reached if Article 5 is construed in light
of the principle whereby, in case of doubt and whenever the contrary is not apparent from the text of a
statutory or treaty provision, such a provision must be interpreted in light of, and in conformity with,
customary international law. In the case of the Statute, it must be presumed that the Security Council,
where it did not explicitly or implicitly depart from general rules of international law, intended to remain
within the confines of such rules.”). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]
46

Supra notes 34, 36, 37. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tabs 3-6.]

47

This report is also called the “Elements of Crimes” which Article 9 of the ICC Statute states “shall assist
the Court in the interpretation of and application of Articles 6, 7, and 8.” Again, Article 6 of the ICC
Statute enumerates the crimes against humanity. ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, ARTICLE 6, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 5.]
48

U.N. Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court (hereafter, “PCNICC”), Report of the
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum 2, at 5, PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2
(2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7.]

18

intent and knowledge, the interpretation of the requisite mens rea written in Article 30
should be intent or knowledge or both.49
It is no surprise that the PCNICC’s report (the “Elements of Crimes”) avoids
defining the mens rea requirement for the underlying crimes in the crimes against
humanity. The definition of each and every underlying crime discussed in the Elements
of Crimes provides only a mens rea of intent or knowledge of the chapeau elements,50
and additional “awareness” of various factual circumstances surrounding the underlying
crimes in the case of: deportation, imprisonment, sexual violence, enforced
disappearance, apartheid, and other inhumane acts.51 Here, “awareness” denotes a mens
rea of knowledge and not recklessness or gross negligence.52 Therefore, Article 30 may
be interpreted to require a mens rea of intent and knowledge where the PCNICC’s report
and the ICC Statute have not defined the appropriate mental states for the underlying
crimes.
However, the ICC Statute and the Elements of Crimes should be considered open
to interpretation by the other international criminal tribunals due to the fact that the ICC
Statute and the Elements of Crimes have not been interpreted or applied by the court

49

CASSESE, supra note 2, at 160. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]

50

PCNICC, supra note 48 at 9, (Example: the definition of the crime against humanity of murder the
PCNICC report states, “the perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part
of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.”). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 7.]
51

Id. at 11-17.

52

THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ARTICLE 30, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm, (“For the purposes of this article, ‘knowledge’ means
awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.”).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5.]
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which they govern.53 Accordingly, the ICC Statute should not be assumed to limit mens
rea to only the most culpable mental states. The ICC Statute should be interpreted to
include recklessness and gross negligence as appropriate mental states in convictions of
crimes against humanity for two reasons; (1) the ICC Statute allows reliance on sources
of law which explicitly permit mens rea with lesser culpability; and (2) the ICC Statute
can be read to include even the least culpable mens rea as sufficient to convict for crimes
against humanity.
First, Article 30 of the ICC Statute is governed by sources of law which allow for
recklessness and gross negligence as acceptable mens rea. Notice that Article 30 falls
under Part 3 of the ICC Statute which is entitled, “General Principles of Criminal Law.”54
Keep in mind that Article 21 of the ICC Statute identifies “general principles of law from
the legal systems of the world” as a source of law upon which the court is to rely.
Conceivably, the drafters of the ICC Statute could have indicated the application of other
sources of law by naming this Part 3 after a different source of law, such as, “Customary
International Law” or “General Principles of International Criminal Law.” However, the
placement of the article that governs the mental state elements of the crimes against
humanity in the part of the statute categorized as “General Principles of Criminal Law”
logically leads one to believe that the mens rea standard ought to be governed by general
principles of criminal law as used in the major legal systems of the world. As will be
demonstrated below, general principles of criminal law in the major legal systems of the

53

As of the drafting of this memo, November 22, 2003, the ICC had not yet tried a case.

54

ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, PART 3, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6.]

20

world clearly recognize at least and recklessness and gross negligence as proper mens rea
to warrant convictions for some of the crimes enumerated as crimes against humanity.55
Second, Article 30 of the ICC Statute does not isolate the mens rea to only
knowledge and intent. In Article 30, the “intent” and “knowledge” should be taken to
identify the required mens rea for the underlying crimes and the chapeau elements,
respectively. In other words, the “intent” expressed in Article 30 denotes the general
meaning of intent56 for the underlying crimes which includes recklessness and gross
negligence. Also, the “knowledge” referred to in Article 30 corresponds to the mental
state required for the chapeau elements.57 This interpretation of Article 30 is concurrent
to findings of mens rea for crimes against humanity in the ICTY: “The requisite mens rea
for crimes against humanity appears to be comprised by (1) the intent to commit the
underlying offence, combined with (2) knowledge of the broader context in which that
offence occurs.”58 The result of this argument is that Article 30 of the ICC Statute gives
only very general instructions and reiterates broad definitions of the sources of mens rea
and leaves the determination of appropriate mens rea for the underlying crimes to the
Chambers.
In summary, the ICC Statute and the statutes of the other international criminal
tribunals do not explicitly allow for recklessness or gross negligence as an appropriate

55

Infra at p. 7.

56

Infra at p. 8.

57

The mens rea of knowledge is generally accepted as the required mental state for the chapeau elements.
See infra at p. 13.
58

Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic, et al., IT-95-16, Judgment of 14 January 2000, para. 556. [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13.]
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mens rea standard for the underlying crimes in a crime against humanity.59 Nevertheless,
the silence of the statutes on mens rea should not be interpreted to limit mens rea to
knowledge or intent. Indeed, as will be discussed below, the above mentioned statutes
have not limited the international criminal courts in their acceptance of recklessness,
gross negligence and simple negligence as legitimate mens rea standards for the
underlying crimes.
2.

Mens Rea and the Underlying Crime in the Jurisprudence of Domestic
Courts and the International Criminal Tribunals
In 1994, the Canadian Supreme Court in Regina v. Finta mirrors the rule of

Article 21 of the ICC Statute to resort to general principles of law of the major legal
systems of the world when confronted with a lack of direction from statutory language
and jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunal.

Finta pointed out that the

international criminal courts lacked established standards for the mens rea requirement of
the underlying crimes of crimes against humanity.60 Finta stated that “the strongest
source in international law for crimes against humanity, however, are the common
domestic prohibitions of civilized nations. The conduct listed under crimes against
humanity was of the sort that no modern civilized nation was able to sanction.”61 Finta
found that since international courts frequently ignore the mental element of the
underlying crime in war crimes and crimes against humanity, “it seems justified to use

59

CASSESE, supra note 2, at 176. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]

60

R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 R.C.S. 701, 754. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12.]

61

Id. at 716, 717.
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our established common law rules of mens rea where the international law does not have
specific standards.”62
War crimes and crimes against humanity do not require an excessively high mens
rea going beyond that required for the underlying offence. In determining the
mens rea of a war crime or a crime against humanity, the accused must have
intended the factual quality of the offence. In almost if not every case, the
domestic definition of the underlying offence will capture the requisite mens rea
for the war crime or crime against humanity as well. Thus, the accused need not
have known that his or her act, if it constitutes manslaughter or forcible
confinement, amounted to an “inhumane act” either in the legal or moral sense.
One who intentionally or knowingly commits manslaughter or kidnapping would
have demonstrated the mental culpability required for an inhumane act. The
normal mens rea for confinement, robbery, manslaughter, or kidnapping, whether
it be intention, knowledge, recklessness or willful blindness, is adequate.63
Finta found it logical to use established domestic notions of mens rea to the underlying
crime in a crime against humanity. 64
In considering the foregoing, national law provides support for using recklessness
and gross negligence as sufficient mens rea for the underlying crime. This is evident
particularly in the case of murder and extermination:
The customary practice of states, evidenced by international and national
military prosecutions, reveals that murder is not intended to mean only
those specific intentional killings without lawful justification. Instead,
state practice views murder in its largo senso meaning as including the
creation of life-endangering conditions likely to result. Combining the
practice of states in national military prosecutions and the in extenso
definition of murder in major systems, one can conclude that murder as
intended under Article 6(c) [of the ICTY Statute] includes a closely
related form of unintentional but foreseeable death that the common law
labels manslaughter.65

62

Id. at 754, 755.

63

Id. at 713.

64

Id. at 760 (“In finding a war crime or crime against humanity, the trial judge must, of course, look for the
normal intent or recklessness requirement in relation to the act or omission that is impugned.”).
65

BASSIOUNI, supra note 12, at 301. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]
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Nine years after Finta, the judgments of the ICTR and the ICTY have made steps
in developing the requisite mens rea for crimes against humanity. However, despite
these developments, the mens rea standard for the underlying crimes continues to suffer
from ambiguity in the jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals.66

The

Appeals Chamber of both the ICTR and the ICTY have scarcely ruled on the requisite
mens rea for the underlying crimes. The ICTY and ICTR Trial Chambers have made
inconsistent judgments as to whether the stricter mens rea standard of recklessness and
gross negligence is appropriate.67 Note also that not all the underlying crimes have
received substantial treatment in the international criminal tribunals. Nor have the mens
rea standards of all the underlying crimes been questioned as to whether lesser culpable
mental states than knowledge or intent are possible.

This section will analyze the

findings of the international criminal tribunals in favor of a mens rea of recklessness or
gross negligence for crimes enumerated in Article 3 of the ICTR Statute.
i.

Murder and Extermination
According to the International Law Commission (ILC) “murder is a crime that is

clearly understood and well defined in the national law of every State. This prohibited
act does no require any further explanation.”68 Despite this clear and simple assertion of
the ILC, the brunt of the conflict of opinion in the Chambers on the mens rea standard for

66

Kupreskic, supra note 56, at para. 556. (“The determination of the elements comprising the mens rea of
crimes against humanity has proved particularly difficult and controversial.”). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 13.]

67

Infra pp. 24-32.

68

Report of the ILC, 48th Session. 6 May – 26 July 1996, p. 96. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 8.]
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the underlying crimes centers on the definitions of murder, and extermination.69 There
are three camps within the Chambers of the ICTY and ICTR that represent differing
opinions on this issue. First, there are those cases that prefer recklessness as an adequate
mens rea for the underlying crimes of murder and extermination. Second, are the cases
which favor mens rea of intent and premeditation. Lastly, there are cases that have
attempted to harmonize the differences in the first two camps.
The first ICTR court to wrestle with the definition of murder and extermination
was the Trial Chamber in Akayesu.70 The Akayesu court presents a notably careful
analysis of mens rea and the underlying crimes. Akayesu discusses the discrepancy in
the definition of the word “murder” between the English and French translations of the
ICTR Statute. The English version, “murder,” is the broader mens rea standard of the
two translations where premeditation is not required and recklessness is sufficient.71
Ultimately, Akayesu resolved the discrepancy in favor of the meaning of the English
word “murder,” rather than the French word “assassinat.”

Akayesu reasoned that

customary international law demands the liberal mens rea requirement in “murder” rather
than “assassinat.”72 Akayesu expressly defines the elements of murder as including a
mental state of recklessness:73

69

BASSIOUNI, supra note 12, at 305. This is probably due to the fact that murder and extermination share
essentially the same elements. The Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Decision of 21
May 1999, para. 142. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 34.]
70

The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4, Decision 2 September 1998. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]

71

Id. at para. 588; see also The Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T,
Judgment of 1 June 2001, para. 138 (“For example, at the high end of murder the mens rea corresponds to
the mens rea of assassinat, i.e., unlawful killing with premeditation. Conversely, at the low end of murder
where mere intent or recklessness is sufficient and premeditation is not required, the mens rea of murder
corresponds with the mens rea of muertre.”).
72

Akayesu, supra note 70, at para. 589. [Reproduced at accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]
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The Chamber defines murder as the unlawful, intentional killing of a
human being. The requisite elements of murder are:
1. the victim is dead;
2. the death resulted from an unlawful act or omission of the accused or a
subordinate;
3. at the time of the killing the accused or a subordinate had the intention
to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm on the deceased having known that
such bodily harm is likely to cause the victim's death, and is reckless
whether death ensues or not.74
Notice the definition uses the term “intentional killing” yet clearly provides for a
recklessness mens rea as to the death of the victim. In this case, the word “intent” or
“intentional” does not follow the general definition of “intent.” It does not refer to the
degree of culpability as defined as “purpose” or “specific intent.”75
On the other hand, Akayesu takes a different approach to the crime of
extermination and finds that a mental state of recklessness is not sufficient to convict.
The Akayesu definition of extermination leaves out the recklessness language and favors
a purely intentional standard:
The Chamber defined the essential elements of extermination as the
following:
1. the accused or his subordinate participated in the killing of certain
named or described persons;
2. the act or omission was unlawful and intentional;

73

Id.

74

The language of this definition mirror the language of the New York Penal Code definition of
recklessness. See infra p. 9.

75

Infra p. 8.
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3. the unlawful act or omission must be part of a widespread or
systematic attack;
4. the attack must be against the civilian population;
5. the attack must be on discriminatory grounds, namely: national,
political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.76
However, seven months after the Akayesu Trial Chamber findings, the ICTR
Trial Chamber in the Kayishema disagrees with Akayesu in the definition of both murder
and extermination. Curiously, Kayishema juxtaposes the Akayesu findings and states
that extermination deserves the broad recklessness mens rea while murder requires
premeditation and intent. Thus the Trial Chamber in Kayishema gave the following
definition of the underlying crime of murder:
The accused is guilty of murder if the accused, engaging in conduct which
is unlawful:
1.

causes the death of another;

2.

by a premeditated act or omission;

3.

intending to kill any person or,

4.

intending to cause grievous bodily harm to any person.77

The Kayishema definition of murder explicitly leaves out the recklessness mens rea that
the Akayesu judgment included. Kayishema reasoned that the ambiguity surrounding the
discrepancy in the English and French translations of murder ought to be resolved in
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Akayesu, supra note 70, para. 592. [Reproduced at accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]

77

Kayishema, supra note 71 at para. 140. [Reproduced at accompanying notebook at Tab 29.]
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favor of the accused.78 Therefore, the Kayishema judgment feels that the more lenient
mens rea standard of “assassinat” should be adopted.79
In arriving at its definition of extermination, Kayishema relies on the Akayesu
finding that elements of extermination and murder are the same with the exception that
extermination “requires an element of mass destruction that is not required for murder.”80
However, Kayishema opposes the Akayesu ruling and concludes that a conviction of
extermination requires a mental state of gross negligence or recklessness:
The actor participates in the mass killing of others or in the creation of
conditions of life that lead to the mass killing of others, through his act(s)
or omission(s); having intended the killing, or being reckless, or grossly
negligent as to whether the killing would result and; being aware that his
act(s) or omission(s) forms part of a mass killing event; where, his act(s)
or omission(s) forms part of a widespread or systematic attack against any
civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious
grounds.81
In justifying the stricter mens rea standard for extermination, Kayishema quotes Cherif
Bassiouni:
Extermination implies intentional and unintentional killing. The reason
for the latter is that mass killing of a group of people involves planning
and implementation by a number of persons who, though knowing and
wanting the intended result, may not necessarily know their victims.
Furthermore, such persons may not perform the actus reus that produced
the deaths, nor have specific intent toward a particular victim.82
78

Id. at para. 139. (“If in doubt, a matter of interpretation should be decided in favour of the accused; in
this case, the inclusion of premeditation is favourable to the accused. The Chamber finds, therefore, that
murder and assassinat should be considered together in order to ascertain the standard of mens rea intended
by the drafters and demanded by the ICTR Statute. When murder is considered along with assassinat the
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Since the decision in Kayishema to oppose Akayesu, the ICTR Trial Chambers
have not cleared up the inconsistency. The Bagilishema judgment wholeheartedly agree
with Kayishema on the mens rea required for murder and extermination.83 Conversely,
Musema84 and Rutaganda85 follow Akayesu on both murder and extermination. Two
recent ICTR Trial Chambers to rule on the issue of mens rea and the underlying crime,
Niyitegeka and Ntakirutimana, only exacerbate the ambiguity by failing to even mention
a mens rea requirement for the underlying crimes.86 In fact, the Ntakirutimana ruling
mentions that the elements of Article 3 of the ICTR Statute are “well established” and
then footnotes Akayesu and Bagilishema (which, of course, do not agree on the mens rea
elements of murder and extermination87) and then defines the elements of murder and
extermination and avoids the mental element of the underlying crimes altogether.88
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Despite the unclear definition of the mens rea requirement for murder and
extermination in the ICTR, the majority of the Trial Chambers in the ICTY that have
ruled that the requisite mens rea for the underlying crimes of murder and extermination
follow the Akayesu judgment on murder and the Kayishema judgment on
extermination.89 This has created a strong precedent to utilize recklessness as requisite
mens rea to convict an accused for the underlying crimes of murder and extermination.
The ICTY Trial Chambers are not without at least some ambiguity on this issue.90
The Kupreskic judgment, in 2000, relies on Akayesu and accepts the recklessness
standard for murder.

However, without significant explanation, Kupreskic cites

Kayishema and combines the opposing mens rea standards of Akayesu and Kayishema.
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Kupreskic, supra note 56 at para. 560-561, [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13];
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Krstic, IT-98-33, Judgment of 2 August 2001, para. 485, [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
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As of the writing of this memorandum, the most recent ICTY case to rule on the mens rea requirement
of murder is the “Tuta and Stela” case, which follows the Akayesu definition:
“(b) Murder and willful killing
The underlying elements of the offences of murder under Article 3 and 5 of the Statute and willful
killing under Article 2 of the Statute are the same. These elements are:
a. death of the victim as the result of the action(s) of the accused,
b. who intended to cause death or serious bodily injury which, as it is reasonable to
assume, he had to understand was likely to lead to death,
The general requirements under Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Statute apply to these crimes.” The Prosecutor v.
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Essentially, Kupreskic has combined the discrepant English and French translations of
“murder” and “assassinat.” Paragraph 561 of Kupreskic reads:

The requisite mens rea of murder under Article 5(a) is the intent to kill or
the intent to inflict serious injury in reckless disregard of human life. In
Kayishema it was noted that the standard of mens rea required is
intentional and premeditated killing. The result is premeditated when the
actor formulated his intent to kill after a cool moment of reflection. The
result is intended when it is the actor’s purpose, or the actor is aware that it
will occur in the ordinary course of events.
Finally, in May 2003, the ICTR Trial Chamber broke ground on the definition of
murder in the Semanza judgment by reviewing the divergence of the ICTR Chambers.91
Semanza gives a very complete analysis of mens rea and the underlying crimes but, still
leaves ambiguity. Semanza relies on Article 33(4) of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties to interpret the differences in the translation of “murder” and “assassinat.”
Article 33(4) “directs that when interpreting a bilingual or multilingual instrument the
meaning which best reconciles the equally authoritative texts shall be adopted.”92 In so
doing, Semanza merges the divergent interpretations of the English and French versions
of murder, similar to the Kupreskic approach.93 “The Chamber finds that it is possible to
harmonize the meaning of the two texts by requiring premeditation.”94

Semanza

distinguishes the mens rea requirement for genocide with that of crimes against
humanity.95 The mens rea requirement for genocide is specific intent96 and the requisite
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mens rea standard for crimes against humanity is a more strict standard.97 Therefore, it
appears that Semanza and Kupreskic intend to require that an accused premeditate his act
or omission (“a cool moment of reflection is sufficient”98) and still demand a recklessness
mens rea for the resulting death of the victim.
In conclusion, in balancing the precedent that has been established in the ICTR
and ICTY, the greatest weight leans in favor of accepting lesser culpable mental states.
The ICTR Chambers are practically split on whether or not to embrace a stricter mens rea
standard. However, the majority of the ICTY cases believe recklessness to be adequate.
Further, the recent cases in the ICTY and ICTR which attempt to harmonize the
differences of opinion recognize recklessness as a legitimate mens rea.
ii.

Rape
Even though the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Kunarac judgment states that the

mens rea requirement of rape is “the intention to effect… sexual penetration, and the
knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim,”99 the practical application of
mens rea in Kunarac seems to be negligence. In Kunarac, in order to determine whether
the perpetrator had knowledge that the victim did not consent to the penetration, the
Appeals Chamber considers the surrounding circumstances under which rapes were
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MORRIS AND SCHARF, supra note 40 at 198. (“The specific intent required for the crime of genocide is
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generally perpetrated by the Appellants.100 In considering the surrounding circumstances
Kunarac uses an objective perspective to test the perpetrator’s knowledge of the victim’s
consent.101 Using an objective test to determine the mens rea of the accused effectively
renders the requisite mental state to simple negligence:102
While negligence thus requires that the defendant’s conduct create an
unreasonable risk of harm to others, he is nonetheless negligent though he
is unaware of the fact that his conduct creates any such risk. All that
negligence requires is that he ought to have been aware of it (i.e., that a
reasonable man would have been aware of it). Thus negligence is framed
in terms of an objective (sometimes called “external”) standard, rather
than in terms of a subjective standard.103
The following excerpt demonstrates the Kunarac Appeals Chamber’s agreement
with the Kunarac Trial Chamber’s objective analysis of the Appellant’s knowledge of the
victim’s consent: “Turning now to the issue of D.B.’s (the victim’s) consent, the Trial
Chamber found that, given the circumstances of D.B.’s captivity in Partizan, regardless of
whether he knew of the threats by Gaga, the Appellant could not have assumed that D.B.
was consenting to sexual intercourse.”104 The Kunarac judgment is not concerned with
the perpetrator’s subjective mental state. Rather what the Chamber finds important was
whether the perpetrator ought to have been aware that “D.B.” was not consenting; this is
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an objective standard.105 When an objective test is used to discern a mens rea element of
a crime, the mens rea requirement is reduced to negligence.106
The opinion of Kunarac, binding precedent on the ICTR Chambers, has taken
away the subjective mental element of the knowledge of an accused with respect to the
victim’s consent to penetration in a crime of rape. It seems as though the ICTY Appeals
Chamber has established the mens rea standard for the crime of rape: intent for
penetration and negligence for consent.
iii.

Other Inhumane Acts
The crime of “other inhumane acts” does not appear in any source of international

or domestic law.107 However, Article 7 of the ICC Statute defines “other inhumane acts”
as: “Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or mental or physical health.” The ICTY generally finds this an
acceptable definition.108 However, the Tadic Trial Chamber found that “other inhumane
acts” included those crimes enumerated in the preceding articles, obviously including the
underlying crimes of a crime against humanity.109 The Kupreskic Trial Chamber agrees,
“In other words, they must be as serious as the other classes of crimes provided for in the
other provisions of Article 5 [(the article of the ICTY Statute enumerating crimes against
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humanity)].”110 Since at least some of the underlying crimes of a crime against humanity
require a mens rea of recklessness or gross negligence (as discussed above), the word
“intentionally” in the ICC Statute and ICTY jurisprudence again refers to the general
meaning of “intent.”111 In support of this argument, Kayishema found the mens rea
requirement to be at least recklessness: “[I]nhumane acts are… those which deliberately
cause serious mental suffering. The Chamber considers that an accused may be held
liable under these circumstances only where, at the time of the act, the accused had the
intention to inflict serious mental suffering on the third party, or where the accused knew
that his act was likely to cause serious mental suffering and was reckless as to whether
such suffering would result.”112
The development of the elements of “other inhumane acts” is far from
established; however, the door has been opened to argue at least recklessness to convict a
perpetrator of “other inhumane acts.”
E.

Mens Rea and Individual Criminal Responsibility: Two Exceptions to
Knowledge or Intent
Commentators on the international criminal tribunals have identified two more

exceptions to the overarching intent or knowledge mens rea requirement for crimes
against humanity in which recklessness, gross negligence and simple negligence become
appropriate mens rea to convict an accused of a crime against humanity.

These

exceptions are both found within the various, fact-driven situations in which an accused

110

Kupreskic, supra note 58, at para. 566. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13.]

111

Infra p. 8.

112

Kayishema, supra note 71, at para. 153. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29.]

35

may be held criminally responsible for a crime against humanity.113 In their respective
2003 scholarly publications, Antonio Cassese and William Schabas discuss these two
exceptions, namely, command responsibility and criminal design (or “joint criminal
enterprise”).114
1.

Command Responsibility
Recognizing superior responsibility as a form of individual criminal

responsibility, Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute states:
“The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present
Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her
superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know
that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.”115
The language of Article 6(3) shows strikingly similar language to the definitions of gross
negligence and recklessness.116 The “knew or had reason to know” language resembles a
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situation in which a person fails to perceive something that a reasonable person would
have perceived in the actor’s situation.
Arguably, Article 6(3) sounds like a simple negligence standard.117

The

Secretary-General of the United Nations described superior, or command responsibility,
as “imputed responsibility or criminal negligence.”118 On the other hand, it has been
established that negligence or irresponsible command over subordinates does not make a
commander criminally liable in the ICTY.119

Still, legal scholars agree that gross

negligence and recklessness are sufficient mens rea to convict an accused of a crime
against humanity under command responsibility,120 as has the Trial Chamber of the
ICTR. The Akayesu case found that the mens rea requirement for superior responsibility
is at least negligence that is “so serious as to be tantamount to acquiescence or even
malicious intent.”121
The ultimate word on the mens rea requirement for individual criminal
responsibility in command responsibility is the Celebici Appeals Chamber. Celebici
slightly narrows the seemingly broad scope of the Statutes of the international criminal
tribunals with respect to command responsibility.
A superior will be criminally responsible through the principles of
superior responsibility only if information was available to him which
would have put him on notice of offences committed by subordinates.
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This is consistent with the customary law standard of mens rea as existing
at the time of the offences shared in the Indictment.122
While the language of ICTR Statute Article 6(3), specifically, “or had reason to know
that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so,” reads as a
negligence standard, Celebici finds that the commander must have had at least some
information available to him with respect to the conduct of his/her subordinates. Willful
blindness of the knowledge of “offences committed by subordinates” may even suffice:
Proof of knowledge of the existence of the relevant fact is accepted in
such cases where it is established that the defendant suspected that the fact
existed (or was aware that its existence was highly probable) but refrained
from finding out whether it did exist because he wanted to be able to deny
knowledge of it (or he just did not want to find out that it did exist).123
Therefore, command responsibility presents the prosecution with a strong tool to
convict an accused for a crime against humanity based upon a commander’s negligent
control over subordinates when the commander has knowledge of the subordinates’
commission or imminent commission of a crime.
2.

Joint Criminal Enterprise
Joint criminal enterprise occurs when perpetrators share a common design to

pursue a criminal course of conduct. Specifically, a joint criminal enterprise arises where
one of the perpetrators commits an act that was outside the common design yet is a
natural and foreseeable consequence of the implementation of the common purpose.124
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The Appeals Chamber in Tadic gives an example of a situation where joint criminal
enterprise arises:
An example of this would be a common, shared intention on the part of a
group to forcibly remove members of one ethnicity from their town,
village or region (to effect "ethnic cleansing") with the consequence that,
in the course of doing so, one or more of the victims is shot and killed.125
Accordingly, the binding Tadic (Appeals) opinion states a clear definition of the actus
reus, and the corresponding mens rea sufficient for a conviction of joint criminal
enterprise in paragraph 228:
227. In sum, the objective elements (actus reus) of this mode of
participation in one of the crimes provided for in the Statute (with regard
to each of the three categories of cases) are as follows:
i. A plurality of persons. They need not be organised in a military, political
or administrative structure, as is clearly shown by the Essen Lynching and
the Kurt Goebell cases.
ii. The existence of a common plan, design or purpose which amounts to
or involves the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute. There is
no necessity for this plan, design or purpose to have been previously
arranged or formulated. The common plan or purpose may materialise
extemporaneously and be inferred from the fact that a plurality of persons
acts in unison to put into effect a joint criminal enterprise.
iii. Participation of the accused in the common design involving the
perpetration of one of the crimes provided for in the Statute. This
participation need not involve commission of a specific crime under one
of those provisions (for example, murder, extermination, torture, rape,
etc.), but may take the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the
execution of the common plan or purpose.
228. By contrast, the mens rea element differs according to the category of
common design under consideration. With regard to the first category,
what is required is the intent to perpetrate a certain crime (this being the
shared intent on the part of all co-perpetrators). With regard to the second
category (which, as noted above, is really a variant of the first), personal
knowledge of the system of ill-treatment is required (whether proved by
express testimony or a matter of reasonable inference from the accused’s
125

Tadic, supra note 39, at para. 204. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]
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position of authority), as well as the intent to further this common
concerted system of ill-treatment. With regard to the third category, what
is required is the intention to participate in and further the criminal activity
or the criminal purpose of a group and to contribute to the joint criminal
enterprise or in any event to the commission of a crime by the group. In
addition, responsibility for a crime other than the one agreed upon in the
common plan arises only if, under the circumstances of the case, (i) it was
foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by one or other
members of the group and (ii) the accused willingly took that risk.126
Notice that with joint criminal enterprise it is not necessary to show that an accused knew
of the risk and acts despite such risk. Rather, the unintended consequences of the
implementation of the common design, must have been “natural and foreseeable.” The
tribunals have determined that an accused is judged based on an objective, reasonable
person standard.127 In other words, the requisite mens rea of a person accused of a joint
criminal enterprise is negligence.128
William Schabas believes joint criminal enterprise to be the “magic bullet” for the
Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY. Since the introduction of the concept of joint
criminal enterprise in the Appeal Chamber of the Tadic case, the ICTY has indicted
Slobodan Milosevic and convicted General Kristic for being a part of a joint criminal
enterprise.
F.

Policy as a Barrier to a Broad Mens Rea Standard in the International
Criminal Tribunals
The ICTY convicted General Kristic of genocide without proving that he actually

intended to commit genocide.129 It was only found that genocide was a “natural and
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foreseeable” result of his acts, and that a reasonable person would have understood the
consequence of genocide.130 General Kristic, a man in his fifties, was sentenced to fortysix years in prison.131
While recklessness and gross negligence have been established as legitimate mens
rea for some crimes against humanity and under certain circumstances, the Tribunals are
aware of the policy against broadening the scope of mens rea for the crimes against
humanity. The ICTY Trial Chamber in Kordic makes this warning:
The expansion of mens rea is an easy but dangerous approach. The Trial
Chamber must keep in mind that the jurisdiction of this International
Criminal Tribunal extends only to “natural persons” and only the crimes
of those individuals may be prosecuted. Stretching notions of individual
mens rea too thin may lead to the imposition of criminal liability on
individuals for what is actually guilt by association, as a result is at odds
with the driving principles behind the creation of this International
Tribunal.132
Also, William Schabas states that securing convictions on a reduced culpability
“diminishes the didactic significance of the Tribunal’s judgments and… compromises its
historical legacy.”
These words of caution seem most plausible in cases where the accused is
convicted of a crime against humanity or genocide based on the accused’s merely
negligent state of mind.133 Despite mitigated sentencing for lesser culpable mens rea, the
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stigma attached to being convicted of a crime against humanity in an international
criminal tribunal assigns punishment beyond the prison sentence which could linger a
lifetime.

In these cases the inherent severity of international criminal tribunals

convictions, coupled with the minimally culpable nature of negligence could threaten
legitimacy of the ICTR. If the people of Rwanda and the international community feel
that ICTR decisions hand out excessive punishment for no fault behavior or nominal
culpability, the ICTR may risk loosing its esteem and legitimacy internationally and
within Rwanda.
In the “Reckless Priest” hypothetical presented above, it is easy to see how
convictions derived from mens rea of recklessness or gross negligence could prove
controversial as well.134 The “Reckless Priest” was not malicious in his conduct and
acted with the intention of aiding victims of civil unrest. If such an individual is indicted
and convicted of a crime against humanity, the application of even clearly culpable mens
rea could threaten the legitimacy of the ICTR.
However, it should be argued that the stigma associated with a conviction of a
crime in the international criminal tribunals does not coincide with the mental state of the
accused in relation to the actus reus. Rather, the stigma attaches to the inhumane degree
inherent in crimes against humanity.135 Finta makes this point in stating that “any stigma

acceptance by civilized nations.” CASSESE, supra note 2, at 172, citing, 4 CMR (1952), 104, 115 (CMA
Lexis 661). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]
134

Infra pp. 4, 5.

135

“In sum, murder, extermination, torture, rape, political, racial, or religious persecution and other
inhumane acts reach the threshold of crimes against humanity only if they are part of a practice. Isolated
inhumane acts of this nature may constitute grave infringements of human rights or, depending on the
circumstances, war crimes, but fall short of meriting the stigma attaching to crimes against humanity. On
the other hand, an individual may be guilty of crimes against humanity even if he perpetrates one or two of
the offences mentioned above, or engages in one such offence against only a few civilians, provided those
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attached to being convicted under war crimes legislation does not come from the nature
of the offence, but more from the surrounding circumstances of most war crimes and
often is a question of the scale of the acts in terms of numbers.”136 In this light, the
broadened mens rea requirement to include negligence (as well as other lesser culpable
mental states) for the underlying crime is not the driving force behind the added stigma of
a conviction of a crime against humanity. Therefore, the argument that crimes against
humanity deserve a narrower mens rea standard due to the elevated level of punishment
fails because the mental state of the perpetrator is not the source of the added culpability.
It is the perpetrator’s state of mind, satisfying the chapeau elements that make crimes
against humanity so heinous and make the added stigma a just desert.
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